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Abstract 
 
A conversion narrative recounts the process that led the speaker to reject one belief for a different, 
usually incompatible, alternative. However, researchers know little about whether, when, and, if so, 
how such messages affect audience attitudes about controversial science. Using a general U.S. 
population-sample experiment, we assessed the attitudinal impact of three versions of a statement 
by Mark Lynas, an environmental activist who converted from opposing to championing genetically 
modified crops. Participants were exposed to 1) a one-sided pro-GM message by Lynas; 2) a two-
sided pro-GM message in which Lynas indicates but does not detail his conversion or 3) a two-
sided pro-GM message in which Lynas explains the process that prompted his conversion. We find 
that his conversion messages influenced attitudes by way of perceived argument strength, but not 
speaker credibility. This finding implies such messages induce greater elaboration, which may lead 
to durable attitudes that predict behavior. 
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Conversion Messages and Attitude Change:  
Strong Arguments, Not Costly Signals 
 
Public understanding of science is often impeded by the influence of social group 
affiliations (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017; Nauroth et al., 2017; Nisbet et al., 2015). In ‘‘the 
competition of voices reaching the individual’’ (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960, p. 
128), individuals often embrace “facts” favoured by fellow group members, polarising beliefs about 
a number of scientific issues (Pasek, 2017; Veenstra et al., 2014). A variety of group identifications, 
including partisanship, religious affiliation, and environmentalism (Drummond and Fischhoff, 
2017; Kahan et al., 2011; Pasek, 2017; Veenstra et al., 2014; 2016), contribute to these belief gaps. 
In other words, gaps between scientific consensus and personal belief in these cases are not 
information deficits but instead are motivated rejections — an issue of trust and credibility accorded 
to experts and findings that conflict with group values (Bauer, 2009). Those responsible for 
messaging in such contexts must be conscious of this fact, and select messengers and content 
accordingly.  
 To overcome these group influences on attitudes toward contested science, individuals and 
organisations turn to a variety of rhetorical devices (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017). One form of 
argument communicators rely on in these contexts is the conversion message. A conversion 
message recounts the process that led the speaker to reject one belief for a different, usually 
incompatible, alternative. Examples of public-facing conversion messaging regarding contested 
science include conversions from anti- to pro-vaccine (Voices for Vaccines, n.d.); climate skeptic to 
climate believer (The Guardian, 2018; Pomeroy, 2018); anti- to pro-nuclear energy (Madrigal, 
2007; Schellenberger, 2017); and as examined in the present research, anti- to pro-genetic 
modification (Storr, 2013).  
 Research centring on intergroup and intra-group communication dynamics (Djupe & 
Gwiasda, 2010) suggests these conversion messages may be an effective persuasive technique. 
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However, the actual effects of such messages remain unknown. We undertake the first test here, the 
results of which may better inform strategic communication campaigns and provide a fine grained 
exploration of this popular form’s pathways to influence over attitudes toward controversial 
science.1 
 We test our hypotheses using a general population-sample experiment in the United States. 
Our focus is the debate surrounding the safety of genetically modified (GM) crops. We test excerpts 
of an actual conversion message, delivered by a science writer and environmental activist, that 
details a transformation from anti- to pro-GM advocate. Conversion messages led to significantly 
more attitude change compared with a one-sided advocacy condition. We find that perceived 
argument strength, and not enhanced speaker credibility, accounts for this effect. In the following 
sections, we provide an overview of the theory behind our hypotheses by explaining potential 
mechanisms that could account for the attitudinal effects of conversion messages. 
Conversion message as persuasive technique  
 Persuasion researchers frequently overlook content, focusing instead on extrinsic factors 
such as source and recipient characteristics. When messages are examined, researchers tend to focus 
on sidedness or order rather than the nature of the messages themselves (Slater and Rouner, 1996). 
This neglect of content has been called “the most serious problem in communication and persuasion 
research,” (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1981, p. 359). Despite calls to address the issue (Johnson, Maio, 
and Smith-McLallen, 2005; McGuire, 2000; O’Keefe, 2002; Reynolds and Reynolds, 2002), 
scholars’ understanding of the effects of the content of arguments remains rudimentary (Hoeken 
and Hustinx, 2009). Although scholars of rhetoric describe an array of techniques that strategic 
                                               
1 We do not make a normative case for the value of the conversion message, but rather examine this common 
rhetorical form’s effects and mechanisms through which these occur. In practice, it should be noted that such 
messages may be employed to overcome group influence to either improve, or ultimately worsen, public 
understanding of science.  
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communicators may employ,2 the functioning and effects of many have yet to be studied 
empirically (Vancil 1993; Slater & Rouner, 1996). In this study, we empirically test a durable 
(Caldwell, 1983) rhetorical form, the conversion narrative.  
 An individual’s “conversion” may be rooted in a transformative experience, a thoughtful re-
consideration of the facts, or some combination of the two.3 Regardless of the domain, there seems 
to be something powerful about a conversion. For this reason, such messages appear to be common 
in public discourse.4 Although scholars have examined the rhetoric of conversion messages (Booth, 
1995; Caldwell, 1983; Fredriksen, 1986; Hindmarsh, 2005; Stromberg, 1993), they know little 
about whether, when, and if so how they influence attitudes at play in a debate over controversial 
science.  
 Despite, or perhaps because of the prevalence of conversion messages in popular culture and 
strategic communication, the perception of their effectiveness is based upon conventional wisdom, 
with surprisingly few empirical tests in persuasion research or other related communication 
literatures. While it is plausible that such messages are persuasive, the size of the effect and their 
mechanism are unclear. In this study, we advance and test two hypotheses that explain why 
conversion messages are effective.  
                                               
2 A few strategies described by rhetoricians but with limited attention from empiricists include the use of 
strategic ambiguity (Reinemann and Maurer, 2005), Rogerian argument (Lunsford, 1979), casuistic 
stretching (Longaker, 2012; Zarefsky, 1980), and various uses of enthymeme (Smith, 2007) and paradeigma 
(Jordan, 1986). 
 
3 Popular uses of the conversion trope have religious origins (Caldwell, 1983). To provide evidence that their 
souls had been saved, those seeking to join a Puritan church had to tell the story of their transformation 
before the congregation. (Caldwell, 1983). “Seeing the light” is now broadly used to describe a range of 
belief change. 
 
4 In politics, for example, conversion messages recount personal transformations that occurred “at a 
particularly opportune time,” (Macgillis, 2011). In a notable 1964 ad for incumbent president Lyndon Baines 
Johnson titled “Confessions of a Republican,” an actor explains his defection from the Republican fold 
(Volle, 2010). Ads containing a voter’s rationale for switching parties are common  (Bell, 2017; Lyngar, 
2014), and tales of personal conversion from bigotry to tolerance on social issues such as racism, 
homophobia, and sexism populate opinion pages (Elliethee, 2013). 
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 The first potential mechanism of conversion message persuasion is the enhanced credibility 
that may attach to a person willing to admit to a dramatic change in belief. Those who switch teams 
to claim a once-derided stance may send a signal that the truth is more important to them than social 
or financial cost. In other words, the fact of conversion alone could make the speaker appear more 
trustworthy, regardless of the strength of the justification for the change. Secondly, conversion 
messages may work through argument strength. The fact that they by definition juxtapose an initial 
and subsequent stance may prompt closer scrutiny of their arguments. If this is the case, conversion 
messages may persuade those sharing a group identity with the speaker if the process underlying the 
shift aligns with the group’s values. At the same time, they may persuade others by appearing to 
provide a carefully considered justification for each claim. Dual process theories of persuasion 
suggest the difference between these mechanisms matters. Greater elaboration (e.g., scrutiny of 
argument strength) leads to more durable attitudes that are more predictive of behavior (Greenwald 
and Leavitt, 1984; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). 
Enhanced speaker credibility  
Unexpected positions by a speaker may appear more credible than expected ones (Petty and 
Cacioppo 1986). Specifically, messages that are costly for a speaker to make are more credible than 
“cheap talk.” For instance, politicians whose messages appear to be damaging to their own party are 
seen as more credible than those who toe the party line, and the credibility bestowed by such costly 
messages tends to materialize regardless of the listener’s political leanings (Berinsky, 2015; 
Groeling and Baum, 2008; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  
This dynamic should be at work when someone who had publicly announced one stance 
rejects it in favor of a competing one. Costs are incurred because the acknowledgement that a 
previously held position was incorrect may carry social stigma and perhaps result in the cut-off of 
access to resources or compensation from those with whom the speaker had once been aligned. 
There is also general social reluctance to admit mistakes (Breines and Chen, 2013). Importantly, 
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though, a conversion message entails more than just a source making a costly statement. A 
politician may engage in costly talk that denigrates a policy of his or her own party, without taking 
or defending a counter position, or without ever endorsing the policy in the first place. By contrast, 
a conversion message includes and justifies the arc of an individual’s opinion change.  
  Dutton (1973) did undertake a study of “convert communicators.” Because the “maverick” 
speakers in his experiment had abandoned a comfortable position to stake a new one – apparently 
guided by principle over payoff – they were seen as more trustworthy and elicited more opinion 
change than were those delivering the party line of their organization.  Levine and Valle (1975) 
similarly found in the context of anti-alcohol communication that a reformed alcoholic was 
evaluated more favorably as a communicator than was “a life-long teetotaller.”  
H1a. Conversion message effects on attitudes will be mediated by perceived credibility of 
the speaker.  
 
Recent research more directly tests the supposition that such messages work through the 
motivation the audience perceives to have guided the speaker. Proposing a “contradiction effect,” 
Reich and Tormala (2013) argue that unexpected contradictions of one’s former stance can prompt 
attributional reasoning – the process by which individuals attempt to explain the causes of behavior 
and events – to determine the source of the shift. If positive attributions (e.g., new information has 
been gathered, greater thought has been accorded to the subject), then the appeal will be more 
persuasive. We test this as a potential alternative – though highly related – way perceptions of the 
speaker might account for a conversion message’s persuasive effects.  
 
H1b. Conversion message effects on attitudes will be mediated by attributions of the 
speaker’s motivation for opinion change.  
 
Enhanced argument strength  
We also explore an alternate hypothesis: Conversion messages work not through altering 
perception of the source, but by increasing the perceived quality of the message. In other words, 
conversion communication will be seen as making stronger arguments than messages that include 
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the same facts, but lack the conversion arc. We test this with three messages: a one-sided advocacy 
message, a two-sided message in which the conversion is mentioned, and a two-sided message in 
which the conversion process is recounted in detail. 
There is substantial evidence that thoughtfully processed, strong arguments are more 
persuasive than weak ones (Johnson, Smith-McLallen, Killeya-Jones, and Levin, 2004; Johnson and 
Eagly, 1989; Wood and Quinn, 2003). Typically, researchers employ a cognitive approach to 
argument strength, focusing on audience perception. In this tradition, perceived argument strength 
is defined as the audience member’s perception of an argument’s quality, strength, and 
persuasiveness (Zhao et al., 2011). This perceptual variable has been shown to be a strong and 
reliable predictor of attitude change (Dillard, Weber, and Vail, 2007). 
There are a number of reasons conversion messages should be perceived as particularly 
strong arguments. Because they include references to a speaker’s prior position as well as her 
current, contradictory stance, they are a type of refutational two-sided message. Refutational two-
sided messages, in which a speaker introduces criticisms against his or her stance in order to rebut 
them, increase perceived argument strength, reduce counter-arguing, and increase persuasiveness 
relative to one-sided messages (Allen, 1991; Hale, Mongeau, and Thomas, 1991; McGuire, 
1985; O’Keefe, 1999).  
Moreover, messages that detail the process of conversion should be seen as especially strong 
arguments. As Djupe and Gwiasda (2010) point out, audiences are likely to consider not only the 
source, but the process by which the source arrived at their decision. Conversion messages that 
include “the consideration of a decision-making process,” (Djupe and Gwiasda, 2010: 75) may be 
seen as stronger arguments for this reason. Although understudied in persuasion research, the 
importance of process information is central in deliberative theory, where “the offering of reasons 
for political choice is the central act of public deliberation,” (Ettema, 2007: 143), and in procedural 
justice, where public perceptions of legitimacy hinge on perceptions of fair process (Gibson et al., 
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2003).  
Why might conversion message effects work through perceptions of argument strength 
rather than speaker credibility? The unexpected incongruence of speaker and message (i.e., a pro-
GM stance from a previously opposed environmentalist) in conversion messages may reduce 
reliance on peripheral cues – such as speaker characteristics – and enhance systematic thinking and 
scrutiny of argument strength (Maheswaran and Chaiken, 1991). This should allow for persuasion 
among both in- and out-group members (Djupe and Gwiasda, 2010). Since the conversion message 
will be dissonant and novel to in-group members (i.e., environmentalists), they may be less likely to 
rely on heuristics, and instead look to the decision-making process to judge the argument. If this 
process is consistent with group identity (i.e., using their acceptance of the science of climate 
change as a model to reconsider evidence about GM food safety), they should be more likely to 
update their attitudes accordingly. Moreover, process cues provide a signal to out-group members 
that arguments are considered, plausible, and well-founded. 
H2. Conversion message effects on attitudes will be mediated by perceived argument 
strength. 
 
The GM Context  
We examine conversion message effects in the context of attitudes toward genetically 
modified crops. Genetically modified crops have been engineered by humans to express, or 
suppress, a specific genetic trait by altering some aspect of an organism’s DNA (National 
Academies of Science, 2016). GM crops, such as corn and soy, are used widely in consumer food 
products in the United States. Because levels of Americans’ knowledge about GM crops tend to be 
low, but people tend to be wary of them, genetic modification is a suitable topic for conversion 
messaging. Only 43% of Americans know that GM crops are available for human consumption, and 
only a quarter (26%) believe they have eaten food that has been genetically modified (Hallman, 
Cuite, and Morin, 2016). About 71% of Americans say that they have heard little or nothing about 
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GM foods, but about 39% believe that GM foods present a risk to human health (Funk and 
Kennedy, 2016).  
In a review of the scientific evidence, the National Academies of Science concluded that 
GM crops are as safe as conventionally grown crops (National Academies of Science, 2016). 
Despite this, the difference in opinion between scientists and the public on the safety of GM foods 
is larger than on controversial issues such as climate change, vaccines, and evolution (Funk and 
Rainie, 2015).  That said, it is important to note that public skepticism toward GM crops is not in 
itself irrational. Little direct knowledge of the subject means individuals’ views are instead 
informed by similar cases (Marris, 2001), an informational shortcut that conserves cognitive 
resources. Further, while reviews of research on GM crops’ effects on environment and health tend 
to find little evidence of negative effects (e.g., Brookes and Barfoot, 2017; Nicolia et al., 2014; 
Panchin and Tuzhikov, 2017), research is ongoing, and the public may take such ongoing debate as 
a cue of uncertainty (Dixon and Clarke, 2013). Moreover, some scientific studies — while 
controversial, or even retracted within the scientific community (Wallace, 2014) — have indeed 
reported negative effects of GM products. Public views may incorporate some of this evidence as a 
credible basis in forming an opinion.  
Importantly though, unlike some other scientific issues, such as evolution or climate change, 
attitudes about GM foods do not seem to be related to political ideology or religious beliefs in the 
American context. Democrats and Republicans are equally likely to find GM foods unsafe to eat, 
and panel survey data show political ideology does not predict attitudes about GM foods (Funk and 
Kennedy, 2016; author removed for blind review). Religious beliefs also often divide attitudes 
about similar science issues such as stem-cell research and synthetic biology (e.g., Ho, Brossard, 
and Scheufele, 2008), but there is no evidence of religious belief influencing attitudes about GM 
foods (author removed for blind review). In sum, knowledge levels about GM foods are low, but 
there are strong perceptions of risk not associated with political or religious beliefs. In such 
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conditions, messages that acknowledge concerns while offering explanations to counter them may 
be particularly conducive to attitude change. In this case, conversion messages may be able to 
persuade individuals to hold attitudes more consistent with scientific consensus.  
Methods 
Sample 
Data were collected by Research Now from March 28, 2017 to April 5, 2017. U.S. adults 18 
years or older (N = 727) participated in the experiment hosted on Qualtrics. This sample excludes 
respondents who took more than 1 hour to complete the survey (n = 75). Participants completed the 
experiment in a median time of 14.10 minutes (M = 15.95 minutes, SD = 8.47).5 Participants were 
55.2% female and 81.7% white, with a mean age of 45.66, SD = 15.81, a median education of a 
bachelor’s degree, and median household income of $75-100,000. Respondents had a mean of .40 
(SD = .85) children under 18. 
Party affiliation was measured with a 7-pt. item ranging from Strong Democrat (1) to Strong 
Republican (7) (M = 3.86, SD = 1.96). Ideology ranged from Very Liberal (1) to Very Conservative 
(5) (M = 3.00, SD = 1.13), and was computed by taking the average of social (2.99, SD = 1.43) and 
economic (M = 3.35, SD = 1.31) subscales (Cronbach's α = .856). Mean religiosity was 2.20 (SD = 
1.30) on a 5-pt. scale of religious service attendance, ranging from never (1) to more than once a 
week (5).  
Design 
                                               
5 The fastest 5% (n = 39) completed the experiment in 6.59 minutes or less. However, we did not attempt to 
identify and drop speeders due to, e.g., Greszki et al. (2015): “speeding primarily adds some random noise to 
the data and attenuates correlations, if it makes a difference at all.” 
 
6 Chronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal consistency. A value of .7 is often regarded as acceptable, but 
the value is dependent on the number of items in the scale such that fewer items may yield lower values 
(Tavakol & Dennick, 2011).  
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The experiment consisted of three conditions designed using video excerpts from a talk 
given by Mark Lynas at the 2013 Oxford Farming Conference.7 The first condition included a title 
page with his picture and note reading “Mark Lynas, author of High Tide: How the climate crises is 
engulfing our planet, and Six Degrees: Our future on a hotter planet, explains why he’s in favor of 
GMOs,” followed by footage of Mark Lynas explaining the benefits of GM crops: that they require 
less insecticide; that billions of dollars of benefits are accruing to farmers in developing countries; 
that eager farmers have pirated them into India and Brazil; and that the technology is safer and more 
precise than conventional methods.  
The second condition included a title page with his picture and note reading, “Mark Lynas, 
author of High Tide: How the climate crises is engulfing our planet, and Six Degrees: Our future on 
a hotter planet, on changing his mind about GMOs,” followed by footage of Mark Lynas explaining 
a shift in his beliefs about GM crops. He discusses his prior beliefs about GM crops (that they 
increase the use of chemicals; that they benefit only big companies; that they are unwanted in 
developing countries; and that the technology is dangerous) and, having realized that these were 
“myths,”  his current beliefs (that they require less insecticide; that billions of dollars of benefits are 
accruing to farmers in developing countries; that eager farmers have pirated them into India and 
Brazil; and that the technology is safer and more precise than conventional methods).  
The third condition included a title page with his picture and a note reading, “Mark Lynas, 
author of High Tide: How the climate crises is engulfing our planet, and Six Degrees: Our future on 
a hotter planet, explains why he changed his mind about GMOs,” followed by footage of Mark 
Lynas explaining what he used to think about GM crops, what he thinks of them now, and how he 
changed his mind about them. This condition included the footage from condition two, but also 
included footage in which Lynas details his realization that the anti-GM movement he helped lead 
                                               
7 Based on a desire to employ externally valid stimuli, we focus on Lynas, a unique figure in his public 
conversion from anti- to pro-GMO environmentalism. We explore this trade-off further in the discussion 
section.  
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was a form of anti-science environmentalism, which was inconsistent with his pro-science 
environmentalism and advocacy regarding climate change. Realizing this contradiction prompted 
additional reading of the scientific literature, through which Lynas shifted his beliefs.   
Condition 1, the advocacy message, was 1:30 in length. Condition 2 was 1:23 and Condition 
3 was 3:15. This design allows us to test advocacy against conversion at equivalent length (1 and 2). 
As we are also interested in the potential effect of decision making process information, we allowed 
Condition 3 to be longer. To maintain the equivalence of 1 and 2, and to avoid introducing 
additional confounding content to these conditions, we chose not balance length across all three.  
Following the stimulus, participants were asked whether the speaker changed his mind about 
GMOs (1 = Yes) – which he did in Conversion conditions (2 and 3) but not the Advocacy condition 
(1). Conducted with ANOVA, the manipulation check showed that the conditions significantly 
differed (F(2, 773) = 92.49, ηp2  = .193, p < .001). Post-hoc analysis using Tukey’s HSD indicated 
that those who saw a conversion message -- both condition 2 (M = .92, SD = .27) and condition 3 
(M = .91, SD = .28) -- were more likely to say the speaker changed his mind than those in the one-
sided advocacy condition (M = .54, SD = .50, both p < .001). The dependent variables were 
measured next followed by the mediator variables. A summary of all items can be found in Table 1. 
Dependent Variable 
Attitudes, behaviors, and policy support were measured as the dependent variable. These 
items were coded such that attitudes and behaviors favorable to GM foods (the argument made in 
the stimulus) were coded high. Behavioral and policy support outcomes were measured on 7 pt. 
scales ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7). These included “I would be 
comfortable eating genetically modified crops,” (M = 4.24, SD = 1.82), “I would support mandatory 
labeling of foods that have been genetically modified,” (reverse coded, i.e., opposition to labelling) 
(M = 2.48, SD = 1.47), and “I would support a ban on growing genetically modified crops,” 
(reverse coded, i.e., opposition to ban) (M = 4.26, SD = 1.75) (Runge et al., 2017; Yue et al., 2015). 
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We also used 5 pt. scales ranging from Not at all Confident (1) to Extremely Confident (5) 
measuring whether respondents were confident that scientists were confident that “that genetically 
modified foods are as safe as conventional foods” (M = 3.39, SD = 1.19), and whether the 
respondent was confident that “genetically modified foods are as safe as conventional foods” (M = 
2.80, SD = 1.36) (Corbett and Durfee, 2004). These five items had a high level of internal 
consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.82); for the main effect analyses, these five items were standardized 
and used to create a mean scale of GM attitude (M = 0.01, SD = 0.75) in order to reduce 
measurement error and improve power (Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder 2008).8  
Mediators 
Perceived credibility (M = 4.65, SD = 1.15) was measured using a 7-pt scale with 6 items, 
addressing the speaker’s sincerity, honesty, trustworthiness, reliability, accuracy, and expertise 
(Cronbach's α = .95).  
Attribution (M = 4.83, SD = 1.20) was measured using a 7-pt scale with 3 items adapted 
from Reich and Tormala (2013) (Cronbach's α = .63): “How likely is it that the speaker gathered 
new information about genetically modified organisms before giving his final opinion?”; “How 
thoughtful do you think the speaker is?”; and “How likely is it that the speaker’s final opinion on 
genetically modified crops was the result of manipulation by others?” (reverse coded). 
Perceived argument strength (M = 4.37, SD = 0.99) was measured on a 7-pt. scale. The final 
measure consisted of the average of perceived argument strength across the four arguments 
(Cronbach's α = .93) made in the stimulus. These included that GM crops benefit insects (M = 4.54, 
SD = 1.08), that they benefit farmers (M = 4.45, SD = 1.08), that farmers are eager to use them (M 
= 4.19, SD = 1.04), and that they are safer than other conventional forms of breeding (M = 4.30, SD 
= 1.17). Each of these individual argument strength measures was the average of 6 items adapted 
                                               
8 We employed 5- and 7-pt. Likert scales based on the original use in the literature for each measure. 
However, in creating our composite dependent variable, we then used standardized z-scores to account for 
the difference.  
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from Zhao et al (2011). The Cronbach's α of individual argument strength items ranged from .84 to 
.88. 
[Table 1 here] 
Random assignment was checked using analysis of variance. Conditions did not differ by 
any demographic (including gender, race, Hispanic origin, education, income, ideology, religiosity, 
and children under 18) with the exception of age and political party affiliation, both of which are 
controlled for in all analyses.  
Results 
Because we ask questions about the mechanism of conversion message effects rather than 
simply whether an effect exists, we therefore explore mediation – the process through which one 
variable exerts effects on another through one or more mediator variables (Preacher and Hayes, 
2008). Bootstrapping, a data-resampling procedure used to produce confidence intervals for an 
indirect effect, is generally seen as a better method for estimating mediation hypotheses than older 
alternatives such as the Sobel test, as it can allow for confidence intervals that are asymmetric 
(MacKinnon et al., 2004; Preacher and Hayes, 2008). Therefore, bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals employing 5,000 samples were calculated to test our mediation hypotheses. These 
statistical analyses were conducted with the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013, Model 4), which used 
ordinary least squares regression to estimate the direct and indirect effects of experimental 
conditions on attitudes about GM foods. PROCESS can simultaneously test the effects of two 
mediators, and their following effects on the dependent variable.  
The competing hypotheses examine the mediating effects of views of the speaker and 
argument strength between the experimental conditions and attitudes about GM foods. The 
experimental conditions were first dummy-coded with the non-conversion message as the reference 
category before being entered as the independent variable, and the model also controlled for age, 
gender, race, education, children under 18, income, political party and political ideology. We 
16 
 
include a number of covariates to adjust for variables expected to relate to GM attitudes, as 
covariate adjustment reduces biasedness of effect size estimation (Lin, 2013; Lee, 2016). Models 
without covariate adjustment (controlling only for party and age, as per the random assignment 
check) are substantively identical and are included in the appendix. The complete results are shown 
in Table 2 (comparing credibility and argument strength) and Table 3 (comparing attribution and 
argument strength).  
[Table 2 here] 
When looking at perceived credibility (H1a), the mediation was not significant. There was 
no direct effect of conversion without explanation (b = .02, p = .88), and no direct effect of 
conversion with explanation on attitudes about GM foods (b = .13, p = .26). There was no indirect 
effect through perceived credibility for either the conversion without explanation condition (point-
estimate = 0.01 (0.01), 95% CI [-0.0111, 0.0153] or the conversion with explanation condition 
(point-estimate = 0.01 (0.01), 95% CI [0.0023, 0.0234]). H1a was rejected.  
Replacing perceived credibility with attribution of the speaker’s motivation (H1b) produced 
similar results. There was no indirect effect through attribution for either the conversion without 
explanation condition (point-estimate = 0.00 (0.00), 95% CI [-0.0134, 0.0042]) or the conversion 
with explanation condition (point-estimate = 0.00 (0.00), 95% CI [-0.0025, 0.0091]). H1b was 
rejected. 
[Table 3 here] 
However, when looking at argument strength (H2), the mediation was supported.9 Both the 
conversion without explanation condition (b = .28, p < 0.01), and the conversion with explanation 
(b = .28, p < 0.01), significantly increased the perceived argument strength. The results indicate that 
the conversion without explanation had a positive indirect effect on perceived argument strength 
                                               
9 For clarity and space, we refer here to the results of the model including credibility. The results of the 
model including attribution in the place of credibility are substantively identical, as reported in Table 3.  
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(point estimate = 0.15 (0.05), 95% CI [0.0375, 0.2554]), as did the conversion with explanation 
condition (point estimate = 0.15 (0.05), 95% CI [0.0436, 0.2501]). H2 was supported. Figure 1 
depicts these results. In sum, conversion messages can influence attitudes about GM foods through 
perceived argument strength, but not perceived credibility of the speaker.   
[Figure 1 here] 
Finally, we considered the possibility of conditional effects on the relationship between the 
experimental conditions and the mediators. We tested the effects of climate change belief, 
environmentalism, and deference to science separately as moderators of the previous mediation 
models. Results indicate that the moderated mediation models were not significant. Deference to 
science directly influenced both perceived credibility and argument strength but did not moderate 
the effect of any treatment condition on the mediating variables. Climate belief did moderate the 
effect of the conversion without explanation treatment on credibility, but the model was not 
significant. Climate belief had no other effects. Environmentalism moderated the effect of the 
conversion with explanation treatment on perceived credibility, but the model was not significant. 
In other words, the mediational pathway of conversion message effects on attitudes by way of 
perceived argument strength was not conditional on key markers of environmental group affiliation. 
Full results of the moderated mediations can be found in Tables A1-A6 in Appendix A. 
Discussion 
Conversion messages appear to be a common rhetorical device used by individuals and 
organisations to overcome the influence of group affiliations on attitudes toward contested scientific 
issues (The Guardian, 2018; Madrigal, 2007; Pomeroy, 2018; Schellenberger, 2017; Storr, 2013; 
Voices for Vaccines, n.d), in part because they highlight how an opposing position is actually 
aligned with the convert’s group’s true values. However, little research has examined the 
effectiveness of this technique, nor do we understand the mechanisms through which it might 
influence attitudes. In this study, we show that the GM conversion messages by a formerly anti-GM 
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environmentalist, Mark Lynas, influenced attitudes toward GM foods via increased perception of 
argument strength and not enhanced speaker credibility. Because conversion messages’ effects stem 
from enhanced perceptions of argument quality, strength, and persuasiveness (rather than a heuristic 
judgement of the speaker), they are more likely to have been processed centrally, leading to more 
durable and persistent attitude changes (Greenwald and Leavitt, 1984; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986, 
Zhao et al., 2011).  
The study showed that when compared to a one-sided advocacy message, the refutational 
two-sided conversion messages, through their perceived argument strength, were more effective at 
influencing attitudes about GM foods (Allen, 1991; Hale, Mongeau, and Thomas, 1991; McGuire, 
1985; O’Keefe, 1999), but found no evidence for credibility as a mediator on GM attitudes 
(contrary to Dutton, 1973). This finding supports the notion that the unexpected shift in the position 
of the speaker – who previously held an anti-GM stance, but after revision now holds a pro-GM 
position – prompted central or systematic processing of the argument (Djupe and Gwiasda, 2010; 
Maheswaran and Chaiken, 1991; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).  
The mediating role of argument strength may stem from the inherent nature of the 
conversion message –  requiring scrutiny, which in turn reveals justified arguments (in comparison 
to a one-sided advocacy message). In this way, conversion messages may serve as an exemplar of 
the deliberative process, with a single source. Moreover, our results suggest the conversion message 
structure can be broadly effective, and not necessarily conditional on audience members’ identity or 
attitudes, at least in similar lower-salience contexts.  
It is also worth noting that we find no difference between a basic conversion message and 
one including more elaborate information about how the conversion conforms with in-group norms. 
A more parsimonious conversion message appears to work as well as a more elaborate version. Said 
another way, conversion messages were more effective than advocacy whether equivalent in length 
(Condition 2), or longer (Condition 3). Moreover, we see no differential effectiveness between 
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conversion messages, despite the length difference. It appears unlikely length played any role in our 
observations. 
In an environment in which attitudes toward contested science are often driven by group 
affiliation and associated value conflicts, these findings point the way toward an effective research-
informed communication strategy (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017). By the same token, however, they 
also suggest the potential for conversion messages that intentionally undermine public 
understanding of scientific issues (e.g., McCright and Dunlap, 2017). 
Although our results are based on a well-powered national sample of U.S. adults, there are 
limitations to this study. First, the findings may not extend beyond the American context. Our 
sample includes a number of individuals who do not have strong pro- or anti-GM attitudes.10 While 
this represents most U.S. adults’ attitudes toward GM foods (Funk and Kennedy, 2016), conversion 
message effects, and mechanisms, should also be tested among those with strong pre-existing 
attitudes about GM foods. We also only examined conversion messages in the context of GM foods, 
where individuals generally have low levels of knowledge and familiarity with GM technology 
(Hallman, Hebden, Aquino, et al, 2004; Funk and Kennedy, 2016). Although a common limitation 
in communication experiments, relying on single message treatments leaves a possibility that any 
effects detected may be specific to the message topic or other characteristics (Jackson and Jacobs, 
1983; Slater, Peter, and Valkenburg, 2015). Similarly, our decision to focus on a single direction of 
conversion -- from anti- to pro-GM -- warrants discussion. To be sure, future work should explore 
conversion messages dealing with different issues, and therefore potentially those of different 
direction.  It is possible that narratives detailing shifts from favoring to opposing something, or 
from agreement with scientific consensus to against, might function differently than the message 
structure we examined. Finally, future work should also consider deep qualitative methods such as 
                                               
1018.6% of participants rated the issue of genetic modification as ‘very’ or ‘extremely important.’ 
Only 8.1% self-reported knowing ‘a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ about the issue.  
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in-depth interviews or focus groups to better understand how the public makes sense of and are 
affected by these messages, which may extend beyond the models we test here.  
Regardless, the persuasiveness of conversion messages has practical as well as theoretical 
implications. On the practical side, first-person delivery of two-sided messages that describe prior 
beliefs and explain current, more scientifically accurate ones may be useful in changing attitudes 
because they are perceived as inherently strong arguments. Although other topics should be tested 
and the longevity of the effect explored in future research, this study suggests that the intuition that 
conversion can help persuade vulnerable populations on scientifically aligned health practices (e.g., 
among vaccine hesitant populations) deserves greater attention.  
Many groups attempt to influence public attitudes toward contested science, and do so by 
turning to a variety of arguments (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017). There is a great deal of research 
demonstrating that arguments perceived as strong are more persuasive (e.g., Petty and Brinol, 
2010); however, there is less research on which particular rhetorical forms are perceived as strong 
arguments by general audiences (Hoeken and Hustinx, 2009; Slater and Rouner, 1996; Vancil 
1993). Our study adds to the field’s understanding by confirming conventional wisdom (Lazarsfeld, 
1949; Watts, 2011) and demonstrating the existence of an effect of an important form of narrative, 
that recount one’s conversion, at least in the context of attitudes about GM foods. Future research 
should test whether conversion messages about other issues related to health and science elicit 
attitudes more consistent with scientific consensus, and are able to influence political or scientific 
beliefs more broadly.    
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 Table 1. Summary of dependent variable and mediators 
 
 
	
 
  
Variable	 Items	 M	 SD	 α	
GM	food	
attitudes		 I	would	be	comfortable	eating	genetically	modified	crops	(7-pt)	 4.24	 1.82	 	I	would	support	mandatory	labeling	of	foods	that	have	been	genetically	modified	(7-pt.)	 2.48	 1.47	 	I	would	support	a	ban	on	growing	genetically	modified	crops	(7-pt)	 4.26	 1.75	 	How	confident	are	scientists	that	genetically	modified	foods	are	as	safe	as	conventional	foods?	(5-pt.)	 3.39	 1.19	 	How	confident	are	you	that	genetically	modified	foods	are	as	safe	as	conventional	foods?	(5-pt.)	 2.80	 1.36	 		 Scale	total	(standardized)	 0.01	 0.75	 0.81	
Perceived	
credibility	 The	speaker	in	the	video	is	sincere	 4.89	 1.30	 	The	speaker	in	the	video	is	honest	 4.67	 1.31	 	The	speaker	in	the	video	is	trustworthy	 4.49	 1.28	 	The	speaker	in	the	video	is	reliable	 4.50	 1.28	 	The	speaker	in	the	video	is	accurate	 4.51	 1.27	 		 The	speaker	in	the	video	has	expertise	on	the	issue	 4.79	 1.23	 		 Scale	total	(7-pt.)	 4.65	 1.15	 0.95	
Attribution	 How	likely	is	it	that	the	speaker	gathered	new	information	about	genetically	modified	organisms	before	giving	his	final	opinion?	 5.29	 1.63	 		 How	thoughtful	do	you	think	the	speaker	is?	 5.25	 1.44	 		 How	likely	is	it	that	the	speaker’s	final	opinion	on	genetically	modified	crops	was	the	result	of	manipulation	by	others?	(reverse	coded)	 3.96	 1.63	 		 Scale	total	(7-pt.)	 4.83	 1.20	 0.64	
Perceived	
argument	
strength	
The	argument	that	GM	crops	require	less	insecticide…	 	 	 	Is	an	argument	for	GM	crops	that	is	convincing	 4.80	 1.43	 	Helped	me	feel	confident	about	GM	crops	 4.41	 1.46	 		 Put	thoughts	in	my	mind	about	avoiding	GM	crops	(reverse	coded)	 4.13	 1.50	 		 Gives	an	argument	for	GM	crops	that	my	friends	would	find	convincing	 4.45	 1.27	 		 Is	a	strong	argument	in	favour	of	GM	crops	 4.77	 1.42	 		 Overall,	how	much	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	argument?	 4.61	 1.40	 		 Sub-scale	total	(7-pt.)	 4.54	 1.08	 0.86		 The	argument	that	GM	crops	benefit	farmers…	 	 	 		 Is	an	argument	for	GM	crops	that	is	convincing	 4.67	 1.44	 		 Helped	me	feel	confident	about	GM	crops	 4.35	 1.46	 		 Put	thoughts	in	my	mind	about	avoiding	GM	crops	(reverse	coded)	 4.14	 1.53	 		 Gives	an	argument	for	GM	crops	that	my	friends	would	find	convincing	 4.34	 1.33	 		 Is	a	strong	argument	in	favour	of	GM	crops	 4.65	 1.38	 		 Overall,	how	much	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	argument	 4.51	 1.43	 		 Sub-scale	total	(7-pt.)	 4.45	 1.08	 0.85		 The	argument	that	farmers	are	eager	to	use	GM	crops…	 	 	 		 Is	an	argument	for	GM	crops	that	is	convincing		 4.32	 1.39	 		 Helped	me	feel	confident	about	GM	crops	 4.10	 1.39	 		 Put	thoughts	in	my	mind	about	avoiding	GM	crops	(reverse	coded)	 4.11	 1.45	 		 Gives	an	argument	for	GM	crops	that	my	friends	would	find	convincing	 4.15	 1.28	 		 Is	a	strong	argument	in	favour	of	GM	crops	 4.27	 1.40	 		 Overall,	how	much	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	argument?	 4.21	 1.39	 		 Sub-scale	total	(7-pt.)	 4.19	 1.04	 0.84		 The	argument	that	GM	is	safer	and	more	precise	than	conventional	breeding…	 	 	 		 Is	an	argument	for	GM	crops	that	is	convincing		 4.36	 1.53	 		 Helped	me	feel	confident	about	GM	crops	 4.25	 1.51	 		 Put	thoughts	in	my	mind	about	avoiding	GM	crops	(reverse	coded)	 4.16	 1.51	 		 Gives	an	argument	for	GM	crops	that	my	friends	would	find	convincing	 4.26	 1.38	 		 Is	a	strong	argument	in	favour	of	GM	crops	 4.47	 1.47	 		 Overall,	how	much	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	argument?	 4.27	 1.49	 		 Sub-scale	total	(7-pt.)	 4.30	 1.17	 0.88		 Scale	total	(7-pt.)	 4.37	 0.99	 0.93	
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Table 2. Effect of experimental conditions on attitudes about GM safety mediated through 
perceived credibility and argument strength, controlling for age, gender, race, education, children 
under the age of 18, household income, political party, and political ideology  
 
  Credibility Argument Strength GM Food Attitudes 
  b (SE)   b (SE)   b (SE)   
(Constant) 4.332 (0.358) *** 3.996 (0.299) *** -2.143 (0.174) *** 
Age 0.000 (0.003)  -0.002 (0.003)  -0.004 (0.001) ** 
Gender -0.134 (0.097)  -0.116 (0.053)  -0.096 (0.041) * 
Race 0.367 (0.125) ** 0.205 (0.104) * 0.017 (0.053)  
Education 0.107 (0.030) *** 0.068 (0.025) ** 0.026 (0.013) * 
Children under 18 -0.001 (0.056)  -0.086 (0.046)  -0.033 (0.023)  
Income -0.042 (0.027)  -0.014 (0.023)  -0.016 (0.011)  
Party 0.049 (0.033)  0.031 (0.028)  0.013 (0.014)  
Ideology -0.142 (0.057) * -0.048 (0.048)  -0.037 (0.024)  
Conversion without 
explanation 
0.018 (0.121)  0.276 (0.101) ** -0.063 (0.051)  
Conversion with explanation  0.129 (0.114)  0.277 (0.095) ** -0.024 (0.048)  
Credibility         0.046 (0.022) * 
Argument Strength             0.530 (0.026) *** 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. N = 597 
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Table 3. Effect of experimental conditions on attitudes about GM safety mediated through 
attribution and argument strength, controlling for age, gender, race, education, children under the 
age of 18, household income, political party, and political ideology  
 
  Attribution Argument Strength GM Food Attitudes 
  b (SE)   b (SE)   b (SE)   
(Constant) 4.220 (0.354) *** 3.986 (0.295) *** -2.145 (0.173) *** 
Age 0.010 (0.003) ** -0.002 (0.003)  -0.005 (0.001) ** 
Gender .037 (0.097)  -0.105 (0.080)  -0.112 (0.040) ** 
Race 0.376 (0.124) ** 0.203 (0.104) * 0.005 (0.052)  
Education 0.089 (0.030) ** 0.066 (0.025) ** 0.026 (0.013) * 
Children under 18 -0.082 (0.056)  -0.081 (0.046)  -0.031 (0.023)  
Income -0.049 (0.027)  -0.013 (0.022)  -0.015 (0.011)  
Party -0.003 (0.033)  0.030 (0.028)  0.014 (0.014)  
Ideology -0.128 (0.057) * -0.047 (0.048)  -0.040 (0.024)  
Conversion without 
explanation 
-0.043 (0.060)  0.146 (0.050) ** -0.034 (0.026)  
Conversion with explanation  0.031 (0.038)  0.093 (0.032) * -0.010 (0.016)  
Attribution        0.067 (0.020) ** 
Argument Strength             0.521 (0.024) *** 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. N = 597 
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Figure 1. Indirect Effect of Conversion Messages on Attitudes about GM Foods 
 
 
 
Note: Indirect effects based on 5,000 bootstrap samples with bias corrected confidence intervals. 
Indirect effect of conversion without explanation through argument strength = .15 (.05) (95% CI 
[0.0436, 0.2524]).  Indirect effect of conversion with explanation through argument strength = .15 
(.05) (95% CI [0.0421, 0.2472]). N = 597.   
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Appendix A 
Moderated-Mediation Models 
 
The credibility-enhancing and argument strength-enhancing effects of conversion messages, 
particularly those that include information about a decision-making process that conforms to group 
norms, should be stronger among in-group members. In the context under examination, we employ 
environmentalism, climate change beliefs, and deference to science (Brossard and Nisbet, 2007) as 
measures of group identification.  
Individuals who hold attitudes in line with the scientific consensus typically have high 
deference to scientific authority. Deference to scientific authority refers to a stable and long-term 
predisposition to believe that scientists know what is best for the public, that they perform research 
that benefits public, and that they should be an authority when it comes to decisions on scientific 
issues (Brossard and Nisbet, 2007). Those with high deference to scientific authority are more likely 
to trust scientists and their institutions (Anderson, Scheufele, Brossard, and Corley, 2011; 
Cacciatore, Browning, Scheufele, et al, 2016), and are also more likely to hold positive attitudes 
towards GM foods (Brossard and Nisbet, 2007). Considering this, it is possible that individuals with 
high deference to scientific authority are more likely to find the speaker credible and the argument 
about supporting GM foods convincing.  
Opponents of GM foods have often included environmentalists who believe there are 
negative health and environmental consequences to adopting the technology. However, it has been 
found that individuals holding pro-environmental attitudes adopt behaviors and support policies that 
help mitigate environmental damage (Bord, Fisher, and O'Connor, 1998; O'Connor, Bord, Yarnal, 
and Wiefek, 2002). A message that discusses the environmental benefits of GM foods including the 
potential to reduce the effects of climate change on crop vulnerabilities (National Academies of 
Sciences, 2016) should persuade those with pro-environmental attitudes and with high concerns of 
climate change. It is reasonable that those with pro-environmental attitudes or those with high 
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concern about climate change will more likely find the speaker more credible and the argument of 
supporting GM that addresses climate change to be convincing. Because of these potential 
conditional effects, we considered the following moderators in the mediation models. 
Environmentalism (M = 4.95, SD =1.23) was measured on a 7-pt. scale, using 5 items  
(Cronbach's α = .87). These items measured agreement with the following statements: “I consider 
myself an environmentalist,” “I make a strong effort to recycle everything I possibly can,” “I worry 
about the effects of environmental pollution on my health,” “Our children’s lives will be worse 
because of our current wasteful habits,” and “I support environmental advocacy groups,” (Veenstra 
et al., 2016).   
Climate change belief (M = 3.43, SD = .80) was measured with a 4-pt. item, ranging from 
“Climate change is just not happening,” to “We just don’t know enough yet about whether it’s 
happening,” to “Climate change is mostly because of natural patterns in the Earth's environment,” 
to “Climate change is mostly the result of human activity such as burning fossil fuels,” (Pew 
Research Center, 2017).  
Deference to science (M = 4.41, SD = 1.18) was measured on a 7-pt. scale using 4 items 
(Cronbach's α = .80) adapted from Brossard and Nisbet (2007). These items measured agreement 
with the following statements: “Scientists know best what is good for the public,” “It is important 
for scientists to get research done even if they displease people by doing it,” “Scientists should do 
what they think is best, even if they have to persuade people that it is right,” and “Scientists should 
make the decisions about the type of scientific research on agricultural biotechnology.”  
Results indicate that the moderated mediation models were not significant. Deference to 
science directly influenced both perceived credibility and argument strength but did not moderate 
the effect of any condition on the mediating variables. Climate belief did moderate the effect of the 
conversion without explanation condition on credibility, but the model was not significant. Climate 
belief had no other effects. Environmentalism moderated the effect of the conversion with 
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explanation condition on perceived credibility, but the model was not significant. Full results of the 
moderated mediations can be found in Tables A1-A6. 
Table A1. Effect of conversion without explanation condition on attitudes about GM safety 
mediated through credibility and argument strength, moderated by deference to science, controlling 
for age, gender, race, education, children under the age of 18, household income, political party, and 
political ideology  
  Credibility  Argument Strength GMO Attitudes 
  B (SE)   B (SE)   B (SE)   
(Constant) 1.888 (0.393) *** 2.195 (0.335) 
**
* -2.156 (0.175) 
**
* 
Age 0.005 (0.003)  0.003 (0.075)  -0.004 (0.001) ** 
Gender -0.073 (0.087)  -0.077 (0.075)  -0.094 (0.041) * 
Race 0.391 (0.124) ** 0.133 (0.096) ** 0.021 (0.053)  
Education 0.073 (0.030) ** 0.042 (0.023) ** 0.025 (0.013) * 
Children under 18 0.003 (0.050)  -0.053 (0.043)  -0.035 (0.024)  
Income -0.047 (0.025)  -0.021 (0.021)  -0.016 (0.011)  
Party 0.049 (0.030)  0.038 (0.026)  0.012 (0.014)  
Ideology -0.034 (0.053)  0.036 (0.050)  -0.035 (0.024)  
Conversion without 
explanation -0.164 (0.421)  0.079 (0.358)  -0.061 (0.051)  
Conversion with explanation  0.090 (0.103)  0.226 (0.088) * -0.021 (0.048)  
Credibility         0.041 (0.022) * 
Argument strength         0.532 (0.027) 
**
* 
Deference to science 0.455 (0.037) *** 0.350 (0.039) 
**
*    
Conversion without 
explanation x Deference to 
science 0.037 
 
 
(0.090)   0.037 
 
 
(0.077) 
        
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001, Indirect effects based on 5,000 bootstrap samples with 
bias corrected confidence intervals. Conditional indirect effect of conversion without explanation 
through credibility, moderated by deference to science = .00 (.01) (95% CI [-0.0080, 0.0148]).  
Conditional indirect effect of conversion with explanation through argument strength, moderated by 
deference to science = .02(.04) (95% CI [-0.0686, 0.1051]). N = 596.   
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Table A2. Effect of conversion with explanation condition on attitudes about GM safety mediated 
through credibility and argument strength, moderated by deference to science, controlling for age, 
gender, race, education, children under the age of 18, household income, political party, and 
political ideology  
  Credibility  Argument Strength GMO Attitudes 
  B (SE)   B (SE)   B (SE)   
(Constant) 1.639 (0.405) *** 2.214 (0.346) 
**
* -2.156 (0.175) 
**
* 
Age 0.005 (0.003)  0.003 (0.003)  -0.004 (0.001) ** 
Gender -0.077 (0.087)  -0.077 (0.075)  -0.094 (0.041) * 
Race 0.303 (0.027) ** 0.133 (0.096)  0.021 (0.053)  
Education 0.074 (0.027) ** 0.042 (0.023)  0.025 (0.013) * 
Children under 18 0.020 (0.050)  -0.051 (0.043)  -0.035 (0.024)  
Income -0.048 (0.024) * -0.022 (0.021)  -0.016 (0.011)  
Party 0.053 (0.030)  0.036 (0.026)  0.012 (0.014)  
Ideology -0.019 (0.053)  0.038 (0.045)  -0.035 (0.024)  
Conversion without 
explanation 0.001 (0.120)  0.248 (0.093) ** -0.061 (0.051)  
Conversion with explanation  0.725 (0.372)  0.084 (0.318)  -0.021 (0.048)  
Credibility         0.041 (0.022) * 
Argument strength         0.532 (0.027) 
**
* 
Deference to science 0.515 (0.050) *** 0.347 (0.042) 
**
*    
Conversion with explanation x 
Deference to science -0.140 
 
(0.079)   0.031 
 
(0.067)         
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001, Indirect effects based on 5,000 bootstrap samples with 
bias corrected confidence intervals. Conditional indirect effect of conversion without explanation 
through credibility, moderated by deference to science = -.01 (.01) (95% CI [-0.0202, 0.0009]).  
Conditional indirect effect of conversion with explanation through argument strength, moderated by 
deference to science = .02(.04) (95% CI [-0.0617, 0.0931]). N = 596.   
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Table A3. Effect of conversion without explanation condition on attitudes about GM safety 
mediated through credibility and argument strength, moderated by climate change belief, 
controlling for age, gender, race, education, children under the age of 18, household income, 
political party, and political ideology  
  Credibility  Argument Strength GMO Attitudes 
  B (SE)   B (SE)   B (SE)   
(Constant) 3.773 (0.474) *** 3.934 (0.401) 
**
* -2.135 (0.176) 
**
* 
Age 0.000 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003)  -0.004 (0.001) ** 
Gender -0.132 (0.098)  -0.106 (0.083)  -0.094 (0.041) * 
Race 0.370 (0.125) ** 0.200 (0.106)  0.017 (0.053)  
Education 0.107 (0.030) *** 0.068 (0.025) ** 0.025 (0.013) * 
Children under 18 0.015 (0.057)  -0.082 (0.049)  -0.033 (0.023)  
Income -0.046 (0.027)  -0.014 (0.023)  -0.016 (0.011)  
Party 0.046 (0.034)  0.028 (0.029)  0.011 (0.014)  
Ideology -0.144 (0.059) * -0.050 (0.049)  -0.037 (0.024)  
Conversion without 
explanation 1.516 (0.482) ** 0.534 (0.408)  -0.070 (0.052)  
Conversion with explanation  0.154 (0.116)  0.279 (0.098) ** -0.030 (0.049)  
Credibility         0.044 (0.022) * 
Argument strength         0.528 (0.027) 
**
* 
Climate belief  0.164 (0.082) * 0.018 (0.069)      
Conversion without 
explanation x Climate belief -0.430 
 
(0.482) ** -0.075 
 
(0.112)         
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001, Indirect effects based on 5,000 bootstrap samples with 
bias corrected confidence intervals. Index of moderated mediation of conversion without 
explanation through credibility, moderated by climate belief = -.02 (.01) (95% CI [-0.0485, 
0.0016]). Index of moderated mediation of conversion with explanation through argument strength, 
moderated by climate belief = -.04(.06) (95% CI [-0.1446, 0.0701]). N = 587.   
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Table A4. Effect of conversion with explanation condition on attitudes about GM safety mediated 
through credibility and argument strength, moderated by climate change belief, controlling for age, 
gender, race, education, children under the age of 18, household income, political party, and 
political ideology  
  Credibility  Argument Strength GMO Attitudes 
  B (SE)   B (SE)   B (SE)   
(Constant) 4.678 (0.502) *** 4.105 (0.422) 
**
* -2.135 (0.176) 
**
* 
Age 0.000 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003)  -0.004 (0.001) ** 
Gender -0.137 (0.098)  -0.116 (0.003)  -0.094 (0.041) * 
Race 0.385 (0.126) ** 0.205 (0.104)  0.017 (0.053)  
Education 0.106 (0.030) *** 0.069 (0.025) ** 0.025 (0.013) * 
Children under 18 0.021 (0.057)  -0.080 (0.049)  -0.033 (0.023)  
Income -0.043 (0.027)  -0.014 (0.023)  -0.016 (0.011)  
Party 0.043 (0.034)  0.027 (0.027)  0.011 (0.014)  
Ideology -0.139 (0.059) * -0.049 (0.049)  -0.037 (0.024)  
Conversion without 
explanation -0.823 (0.122)  0.268 (0.103) ** -0.070 (0.052)  
Conversion with explanation  -0.824 (0.458)  0.081 (0.386)  -0.030 (0.049)  
Credibility         0.044 (0.022) * 
Argument strength         0.528 (0.027) 
**
* 
Climate belief  -0.092 (0.091)   -0.030 (0.077)      
Conversion with explanation x 
Climate belief 0.271 
 
(0.127)   0.055 
 
(0.107)         
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001, Indirect effects based on 5,000 bootstrap samples with 
bias corrected confidence intervals. Index of moderated mediation of conversion without 
explanation through credibility, moderated by climate belief = .01 (.01) (95% CI [0.0003, 0.0356]). 
Index of moderated mediation of conversion with explanation through argument strength, 
moderated by climate belief = .03(.05) (95% CI [-0.0783, 0.1301]). N = 587.   
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Table A5. Effect of conversion without explanation condition on attitudes about GM safety 
mediated through credibility and argument strength, moderated by environmentalism, controlling 
for age, gender, race, education, children under the age of 18, household income, political party, and 
political ideology  
  Credibility  Argument Strength GMO Attitudes 
  B (SE)   B (SE)   B (SE)   
(Constant) 3.523 (0.434) *** 3.838 (0.366) 
**
* -2.126 (0.175) 
**
* 
Age -0.001 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003)  -0.004 (0.001) ** 
Gender -0.172 (0.097)  -0.131 (0.082)  -0.098 (0.041) * 
Race 0.388 (0.125) ** 0.195 (0.105)  0.004 (0.053)  
Education 0.098 (0.030) ** 0.068 (0.025) ** 0.025 (0.013) * 
Children under 18 0.000 (0.056)  -0.080 (0.049)  -0.034 (0.023)  
Income -0.043 (0.027)  -0.015 (0.023)  -0.016 (0.012)  
Party 0.046 (0.034)  0.026 (0.029)  0.009 (0.014)  
Ideology -0.117 (0.059) * -0.043 (0.050)  -0.031 (0.025)  
Conversion without 
explanation 0.690 (0.441)  0.246 (0.371)  -0.068 (0.051)  
Conversion with explanation  0.182 (0.115)  0.279 (0.098) ** -0.034 (0.048)  
Credibility         0.048 (0.022) * 
Argument strength         0.525 (0.026) 
**
* 
Environmentalism 0.162 0.049) ** 0.031 (0.041)      
Conversion without 
explanation x 
Environmentalism -0.126 
 
 
(0.086)   0.010 
 
 
(0.072) 
        
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001, Indirect effects based on 5,000 bootstrap samples with 
bias corrected confidence intervals. Index of moderated mediation of conversion without 
explanation through credibility, moderated by climate belief = -.01 (.01) (95% CI [-0.0245, 
0.0024]). Conditional indirect effect of conversion with explanation through argument strength, 
moderated by climate belief = .00 (.04) (95% CI [-0.0773, 0.0879]). N = 590.   
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Table A6. Effect of conversion with explanation condition on attitudes about GM safety mediated 
through credibility and argument strength, moderated by environmentalism, controlling for age, 
gender, race, education, children under the age of 18, household income, political party, and 
political ideology  
  Credibility  Argument Strength GMO Attitudes 
  B (SE)   B (SE)   B (SE)   
(Constant) 4.172 (0.459) *** 3.985 (0.388) 
**
* -2.126 (0.175) 
**
* 
Age -0.001 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.003)  -0.004 (0.001) ** 
Gender -0.170 (0.097)  -0.133 (0.082)  -0.098 (0.041) * 
Race 0.391 (0.124) ** 0.199 (0.105)  0.004 (0.053)  
Education 0.094 (0.030) ** 0.066 (0.025) ** 0.025 (0.013) * 
Children under 18 0.003 (0.055)  -0.079 (0.048)  -0.034 (0.023)  
Income -0.038 (0.027)  -0.014 (0.023)  -0.016 (0.012)  
Party 0.053 (0.034)  0.033 (0.029)  0.009 (0.014)  
Ideology -0.112 (0.059)  -0.041 (0.050)  -0.031 (0.025)  
Conversion without 
explanation 0.032 (0.122)  0.268 (0.103)  -0.068 (0.051)  
Conversion with explanation  -0.873 (0.420) * -0.059 (0.355) ** -0.034 (0.048)  
Credibility         0.048 (0.022) * 
Argument strength         0.525 (0.026) 
**
* 
Environmentalism 0.037 (0.054)   0.005 (0.045)      
Conversion with explanation x 
Environmentalism 0.206 
 
(0.079) * 0.066 
 
(0.068)         
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,  *** p < 0.001, Indirect effects based on 5,000 bootstrap samples with 
bias corrected confidence intervals. Index of moderated mediation of conversion without 
explanation through credibility, moderated by climate belief = -.01 (.01) (95% CI [0.0010, 0.0291]). 
Conditional indirect effect of conversion with explanation through argument strength, moderated by 
climate belief = .04 (.04) (95% CI [-0.0421, 0.1171]). N = 590.   
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Appendix B 
Results without covariate adjustment 
 
 
 
Table B1. Effect of experimental conditions on attitudes about GM safety mediated through 
perceived credibility and argument strength, controlling for age and political party. 
 
  Credibility  Argument Strength GM Food Attitudes 
  b (SE)   b (SE)   b (SE)   
(Constant) 4.620 (0.164) *** 4.240 (0.138) *** -2.352 (0.114) *** 
Age 0.001 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.002)  -0.003 (0.001) * 
Party -0.015 (0.024)  0.002 (0.020)  -0.004 (0.010)  
Conversion without 
explanation 
0.037 (0.059)  0.130 (0.050) ** -0.023 (0.025)  
Conversion with explanation  0.047 (0.037)  0.087 (0.031) * -0.016 (0.016)  
Credibility         0.057 (0.021) ** 
Argument Strength             0.531 (0.025) *** 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. N = 642 
 
Table B1 reports the results while controlling only for age and party, which are included due 
to the results of the random assignment check. As with the covariate-adjusted model reported in the 
main text, when looking at perceived credibility, the mediation was not significant. There was no 
direct effect of conversion without explanation (b = .04, p = .53), and no direct effect of conversion 
with explanation on attitudes about GM foods (b = .05, p = .21). There was no indirect effect 
through perceived credibility for either the conversion without explanation condition (point-
estimate = 0.0021 (0.004), 95% CI [-0.0042, 0.0121]) or the conversion with explanation condition 
(point-estimate = 0.003 (0.002), 95% CI [-0.0008, 0.0093]).  
Again reflecting the primary covariate-adjusted model results, when looking at argument 
strength, the mediation was supported. Both the conversion without explanation condition (b = .13, 
p  < 0.01), and the conversion with explanation (b = .09, p < 0.05), significantly increased the 
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perceived argument strength. The results indicate that the conversion without explanation had a 
positive indirect effect on perceived argument strength (point estimate = 0.069 (0.027), 95% CI 
[0.0168,  0.1216]), as did the conversion with explanation condition (point estimate = 0.046 (0.017), 
95% CI [0.0148, 0.0816]). In sum, there were no substantive differences between covariate-adjusted 
and non-covariate adjusted models.  
Table B2. Effect of experimental conditions on attitudes about GM safety mediated through 
attribution and argument strength, controlling for age and political party. 
 
  Attribution  Argument Strength GM Food Attitudes 
  b (SE)   b (SE)   b (SE)   
(Constant) 4.626 (0.166) *** 4.246 (0.138) *** -2.389 (0.116) *** 
Age 0.010 (0.003)  -0.001 (0.002)  -0.004 (0.001) * 
Party -0.056 (0.025)  0.001 (0.020)  -0.005 (0.010)  
Conversion without 
explanation 
-0.034 (0.060)  0.138 (0.050) ** -0.022 (0.025)  
Conversion with explanation  0.028 (0.038)  0.089 (0.031) ** -0.013 (0.016)  
Attribution        0.071 (0.019) *** 
Argument Strength             0.530 (0.023) *** 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. N = 638 
 
Table B2 reports the results substituting attribution for credibility, while controlling only for 
age and party, which are included due to the results of the random assignment check. As with the 
covariate-adjusted model reported in the main text, when looking at attribution, the mediation was 
not significant. There was no direct effect of conversion without explanation (b = -.02, p = .39), and 
no direct effect of conversion with explanation on attitudes about GM foods (b = -.01, p = .41). 
There was no indirect effect through attribution for either the conversion without explanation 
condition (point-estimate = -0.0025 (0.004), 95% CI [-0.0122, 0.0053]) or the conversion with 
explanation condition (point-estimate = 0.0020 (0.002), 95% CI [-0.0032, 0.0089]).  
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Again reflecting the covariate-adjusted model results, when looking at argument strength, 
the mediation was supported. Both the conversion without explanation condition (b = .14, p < 
0.01), and the conversion with explanation (b = .09, p < 0.01), significantly increased the perceived 
argument strength. The results indicate that the conversion without explanation had a positive 
indirect effect on perceived argument strength (point estimate = 0.073 (0.027), 95% CI [0.0200, 
0.1258]), as did the conversion with explanation condition (point estimate = 0.047 (0.017), 95% CI 
[0.0145, 0.0809]). In sum, there were no substantive differences between covariate-adjusted and 
non-covariate adjusted models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
